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Abstract 
This paper sought to assess the effect of executive compensation on the financial performance of insurance 
companies in Kenya. The study considered functional form relationship between the level of executive 
remuneration and key performance ratios by using a regression model that establishes the relationship between 
pay and financial performance. The results show that there is a non-significant relationship between executive 
compensation and financial performance, P-Value>0.05. The negative correlation suggests the capping of 
executive compensation to maximize shareholders returns. This advocates that key performance ratios are not 
key considerations in determining executive compensation among the insurance companies in Kenya. Hence 
there is need to sensitize executives to align their payment to accounting performance measures because they are 
directly linked to shareholder’s wealth maximization. The study’s findings are useful to managers in insurance 
companies for strategic planning. The arguments of this study are based on the agency theory and review of 
relevant literature.   
Keywords: Executive, compensation, financial performance, agency theory, corporate governance, Key ratios 
 
1.0 Introduction   
Executives who are improperly compensated may not have the incentive to perform in the best interest of 
shareholders, which can be costly to the shareholders. The level of executive compensation and its relationship 
to firm financial performance are central issues in a generally heated debate among legislators, corporate 
directors, economists, financial journalist and compensation professionals (Lambert and Larcker, 1985). 
The common proposition underlying executive compensation is that in order to motivate executives to spend 
effort and work for the best interest of the shareholders, compensation contracts should include some form of 
incentive component (Murphy, 1998). Such an incentive component should establish a link between executive 
compensation and the performance of the firm they manage. Shareholders are mainly interested in maximizing 
their wealth. Executive compensation can be used as an effective instrument for creating value for shareholders 
by improving their firm performance (El Akremi et al 2001). 
Remuneration to executives serves as an incentive that affects decisions made and strategies adopted by an 
executive, both of which affect firm performance. It has a motivational effect and is an indicator of value for 
executives. It is a means for executives to realize rewards for their efforts. In corporate context, executives 
participate in the firm’s profitability. Therefore, when executive makes sound decisions and engages in 
profitable strategies, the executive and the organization realize financial enrichment (Finkelstein and Boyd, 
1998). 
1.1. Statement of the problem 
Good compensation schemes motivate managers to make expenditure decisions that maximize shareholders 
wealth. A manager whose compensation consists entirely of a fixed salary would have no incentive to increase 
shareholder wealth because he does not share in any of the resulting gains (Murphy, 1998). This incentive 
problem can be reduced by making part of an executive’s compensation depend upon the firm’s financial 
performance. Lambert and Larcker, (1985) concluded that compensation schemes really do matter in the sense 
that executives responds predictably to the incentives built in to their compensation contracts. Furthermore they 
noted that changes in compensation plans affect executive decision making in ways consistent with agency 
theory. Ozkan (2007) found a positive and significant link between CEO cash compensation and firm 
performance. He also noted a positive but not significant relationship between total compensation and firm 
performance. Kajola (2008), found a positive and significant relationship between Profit Margins and chief 
executive status. Fahd Al-Heizan (2001) found a significant relationship between market value per share and the 
percentage of stock options granted to the total number of shares outstanding. He also noted less significant 
relationship between market value per share and stock based compensation. However, Aduda (2011) found a 
statistically negative non-significant relationship between executive compensation and performance of 
commercial banks in Kenya. Fernandez, (2005), found out that company performance is not significantly related 
to executive compensation. In view of the above conflicting findings, this study was set out to assess the 
relationship between executive compensation and financial performance of insurance companies in Kenya. 
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1.2. The main objective of the Study 
The main objective of the study was to assess the relationship between executive compensation and performance 
of insurance companies in Kenya. 
1.3. Hypothesis of the Study 
The study tested the null hypothesis that, there is no statistically significant relationship between executive 
compensation and the firm’s financial performance. 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Compensation and Agency Problem 
Agency theory predicts that the misalignment of interests between shareholders and managers could lead to 
agency problems, like, managers engaging in activities for their own benefits rather than the benefits of the 
firm’s shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Executive compensation plans borrows heavily from agency 
problem. It aims at resolving the principal-agent conflict since it aligns the interest of chief executive officers to 
those of shareholders. The design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing 
the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2003). 
Management incentive compensation plans are viewed as means of reducing potential conflicts of interest 
between management and shareholders. An effective compensation program can add value to the firm by 
improving the alignment of management incentives with stockholder interest. Since the objective of corporation 
shareholders is to maximize wealth; agency theory predicts that chief executive officers compensation policies 
will depend on changes in shareholder wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
2.1.1 Mitigation against Agency Problem 
There are two polar positions for dealing with shareholder-manager agency conflicts. In one extreme the firm's 
managers are compensated entirely on the basis of stock price changes. Agency costs will be low because 
managers have great incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. It would be extremely difficult, however, to 
hire talented managers under these contractual terms because the firm's earnings would be affected by economic 
events that are not under managerial control. At the other extreme, stockholders could monitor every managerial 
action, but this would be extremely costly and inefficient. The optimal solution is tying executive compensation 
to performance with little monitoring (Fama 1980). 
2.2.Compensation and Corporate Governance 
Remuneration practices are part of sound corporate governance of an insurer. The remuneration policy is neither 
intended to unduly restrict nor reduce an insurer’s ability to attract and retain skilled talent by prescribing any 
particular form or level of individual remuneration. Rather, it aim to promote the alignment of remuneration 
policies with the long term interests of insurers to avoid excessive risk taking, thereby promoting sound 
governance. The standard and guidance apply to the supervision of remuneration policies and practices, 
especially where variable remuneration is used, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the 
insurers business (International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 2011).  
Executives can be overpaid and be protected from poor performance diminishing the relationship between 
executive pay and financial performance. Managerial power and influence play a major role in shaping executive 
pay, and in ways that end up imposing significant costs on investors and the economy (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). 
When corporate governance is weak, managers have a greater influence on the amount and composition of their 
own compensation. Chief executive officers can be overpaid because of their influence over the board of 
directors.  
The board should be monitoring top managers on shareholders behalf therefore must have significant influence 
over the committee that sets the compensation (Sigler, 2011). 
2.3.Types of conflict in insurance companies 
The principal-agent problem is pervasive in financial institutions and markets. The most apparent conflict of 
interest is between stockholder and policyholders. Incentive conflicts exist between principals and agents 
whenever agents do not bear the full wealth effect of their actions in light of mere existence of default risk. If the 
claims held by policy holders are free from default risk, there will be no incentive conflict, since the value of 
these claims will not change as a result of investment, underwriting and dividend policies made on behalf of 
stockholders (Garven,1987). 
The risky insurance policyholders will experience incentive conflicts with stockholders because the stockholders 
will be able to effect wealth transfers from policyholders by altering insures investment, underwriting or 
dividend policy after issuance of insurance. However since policyholders recognize the incentives faced by 
stockholders, the prices they are willing to pay for the policies reflect unbiased estimate of the expected behavior 
of stockholders. Furthermore the greater the premium-capital ratio employed by the firm, the greater will be the 
magnitude of agency cost borne by stockholders in the guise of lower premiums (Garven, 1987).  
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The second important conflict that arises is between managers and stockholders. Agency theory suggests that, in 
imperfect labor and capital markets, managers will seek to maximize their own utility at the expense of corporate 
shareholders. Agents have the ability to operate in their own self-interest rather than in the best interests of the 
firm because of asymmetric information for example managers know better than shareholders whether they are 
capable of meeting the shareholders' objectives and uncertainty for example myriad factors contribute to final 
outcomes, and it may not be evident whether the agent directly caused a given outcome, positive or negative 
(Garven, 1987).  
2.4.Components of Executive Compensation Plans 
Rewards are monetary, non-monetary and psychological payments that an organization provides for its 
executives. They are designed to attract new employees to the organization, elicit good work performance and 
maintain commitment to the organization. Direct pay is what it is received in the bank account: basic salary, 
overtime, commission, merit pay, paid leave, bonuses and company profit-sharing. Indirect pay, often called 
benefits, includes health and life insurance cover, retirement and pension plans, company car, health care, health 
club memberships, mobile phone, subsidized meals and subsidized entertainment (Koala Consulting and 
Training, 2008). 
2.5.Problems with Pay Components 
Pay component entice executives to engage in activities that produce problems for the firm. Cash bonuses tied to 
accounting numbers may motivate executive to manipulate the timing of revenues and expenses to maximize 
their compensation. It focuses executives on short term performance which may be detrimental to the long term 
health of the firm (Sigler, 2011). Rewarding top management with different forms of stock compensation may 
not tie the executive’s efforts to company performance closely enough. The stock price may rise or fall from 
market forces and not from moves of the company’s executives. This is especially true with stock options. The 
manager can become wealthy by being in the right place at the right time and not by the merits of his 
performance. This could actually offer a disincentive to work hard if the stock price rises regardless of effort. 
Problems may also occur if the stock price declines after executive stock options are issued putting the options 
being way out of the money.  
With options so far out of the money, it may not give the manager the incentive to exert effort to move the stock 
price. In other instances executive may be enticed to manipulate accounting numbers when they are about to 
exercise their options to give the appearance of superior firm performance to drive up the stock price. Restricted 
stock rewards executives for performance but it restricts the stock from being sold by the executive for a period. 
This may not encourage the manager to set a high priority on accomplishing company goals in the near term 
(Sigler, 2011). 
The mixing of the different components of pay into a complex compensation package for executives allows the 
shortcoming of one component to be offset by the strength of another. Cash bonuses focus executives on the 
immediate success of the firm by paying them for reaching short-term goals. This counters the shortcoming of 
restricted stock that base awards on the long run outcomes and does not pay rewards for short-term production. 
To reduce the problem of the company stock price moving based on market forces and not that of the executive’s 
efforts, companies have installed adjustable exercise prices for stock options that are linked to the price 
movement of a market index of stocks (Sigler, 2011). 
2.6.Models in Evaluating Financial Soundness 
It is important for regulators to take action early to prevent insolvency or financial distress of life insurers. To do 
otherwise would incur high social costs and impact the financial button line. The financial rating system 
improves and regulates the solvency of insurers. The CAMEL model has been used successfully by bankers’ to 
construct a financial rating system. The objective of the CAMEL-S is to help the insurance regulators supervise 
companies’ financial soundness. CAMEL-S ratings provide a numerical ranking to indicate the soundness of the 
institution as assigned by supervisors (Hsiao 2009). 
First, capital adequacy in the model evaluates whether an insurer provides sufficient capital to meet obligation. 
An insurer who has sufficient capital usually is considered having less chance to default. Regulators require that 
insurers have to satisfy fixed minimum capital acquirements to operate. Leverage ratio serves as an indicator of 
the riskiness of the owner’s investment in the firm. This ratio not only measures the ability of a company to meet 
financial obligations, but the use of debt financing. A company with high leverage implies having high debt 
financing that will be considered having high financial uncertainty and insolvency risk (Shiu et al 2008).  
Secondly, profitability is a reflection of how well insurers underwriting profile and the efficiency of surpluses 
investment. Supervisors, analysts and investors will through the extent of profitability evaluate the periodic 
financial success of an insurer and examine an insurer’s performance that an insurer employs asset to generate 
returns. The more profitable the insurer is, the higher the business continuity and financial strength (Shiu et al 
2008). 
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Thirdly, liquidity shows the speed of a company’s assets transferring to cash. Insurers liquidity is considered an 
ability to respond quickly to operational cash calls and insures that has well liquidity can face the sudden 
emergent financial needs. Current liquidity ratio is a significant indicator of solvency and the stability of 
liquidity ratio is an essential assessment of corporate solvency. Insurers with a high degree of liquidity are 
expected to have a high business continuity and financial strength (Shiu et al 2008). 
Fourthly, Management: Governance shows how well the company’s board of director’s functions, including the 
diversity of its technical expertise, its independence from management, and its ability to make decisions flexibly 
and effectively. Human resources evaluates whether the department of human resources provides clear guidance 
and support to operations staff, including recruitment and training of new personnel, incentive systems for 
personnel, and performance evaluation system. Processes, controls and audit shows the degree to which the 
company has formalized key processes and the effectiveness with which it controls risk throughout the 
organization, as measured by its control environment and the quality of its internal and external audit. 
Information Technology System assesses whether computerized information systems are operating effectively 
and efficiently, and are generating reports for management purposes in a timely and accurate manner. Strategic 
planning and budgeting shows whether the institution undertakes a comprehensive and participatory process for 
generating short- and long-term financial projections and whether the plan is updated as needed and used in the 
decision making process (Sarker, 2005). 
Fifthly, asset quality; asset represents all the assets of the insurer, current and fixed, loan portfolio, investments 
and real estate owned as well as off balance sheet transactions. Portfolio classification system reviews portfolio 
schedules and assesses company's policies associated with assessing portfolio risk. Productivity of long-term 
assets evaluates company’s policies for investing in fixed assets. In the standard CAMELS framework, asset 
quality is assessed according to the level, distribution and severity of classified assets, the adequacy of valuation 
reserves and the demonstrated ability to administer and collect premiums (Sarker, 2005). 
Sixthly, the sensitivity to market risk is assessed by the degree to which changes in market prices, notably 
interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices, and equity prices adversely affect an insurer’s earnings and 
capital. This come in the form of sensitivity of the financial institution’s net earnings or the economic value of its 
capital to changes in interest rates under various scenarios and stress environments. Volume, composition and 
volatility of any foreign exchange or other trading positions taken by the financial institution. Actual or potential 
volatility of earnings or capital because of any changes in market valuation of trading portfolios or financial 
instruments. Ability of management to identify, measure, monitor and control interest rate risk as well as price 
and foreign exchange risk where applicable and material to an institution (Sarker, 2005).  
2.7.Empirical Studies 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) provided an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of 
a managerial power approach to executive compensation. They concluded that managerial power and rent 
extraction play an important role in executive compensation and have significant implications on corporate 
governance. They noted that, the extent to which managerial influence can move compensation arrangements 
away from optimal contracting outcomes depends on the extent to which market participants recognize the 
problems. They noted that Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership cannot be expected to 
bargain at arm’s length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay 
arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to 
which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. This way it is seen that managers have the power to 
design their pay. 
Evans and Evans (2000) examined the link between Economic Value Added (EVA) as a measure of firm 
performance and the form of executive compensation of 209 companies in Australia in the period 1995 – 1998 to 
try and provide evidence supporting incentive compensation. They reiterated that agency theory has been widely 
applied to the study of executive compensation in an endeavour to establish whether executive rewards are being 
set in a manner consistent with the theory. They found out that, equity based pay was positively linked to EVA 
performance, supporting the contention that where a Chief Executive Officer has significant investment in the 
company the division between owners and management is minimized and agency costs are reduced. In contrast, 
they noted that CEO cash pay was not significantly associated with EVA performance. 
Aduda (2011) examined the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance on commercial 
banks listed at the Nairobi Stock Exchange. The study considered functional form relationship between the level 
of executive remuneration and accounting performance measures by using a regression model that relates pay 
and performance. He found out that accounting measures of performance are not key considerations in 
determining executive compensation among the banks in Kenya and that size is a key criterion in determining 
executive compensation as it was significantly but negatively related to compensation. The negative correlation 
suggests the capping of executive compensation to ensure maximization of returns to shareholders. 
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El Akremi et al (2001), studied compensation strategies for (CEO) from various economic, political and 
symbolic perspectives. They developed a theoretical model to study the hypothetical influence of several 
phenomena suggested by theoretical work on executive compensation in France on a sample of 106 chief 
executives from firms amongst the top 700 rated by sales. Their results suggest that agency theory offers a priori 
the most solid explanation of CEO compensation because of the links observed between the control exercised by 
the principal, the intensity of short-term incentives and the sensitivity of direct pay to performance. They noted 
that a balance of power between board members and top executives seems to be a determining factor in the 
determination of the structure and management of CEO compensation. Further they reiterated that the political 
perspective remains coherent with agency theory by supposing that CEOs can be tempted to make use of their 
privileged position concerning compensation decisions. 
Ozkan (2007) examined the link between CEO pay and performance employing a data set of 390 UK non-
financial firms from the FTSE All Share Index for the period 1999-2005. He included cash and equity-based 
components of CEO compensation in his analysis. The results indicated a positive and significant link between 
CEO cash compensation and performance however the link between total compensation and performance was 
positive but not significant. Their findings also suggest that larger firms pay their CEOs higher compensation, 
which one can interpret as reflecting their demand for higher quality CEO talent. Further he noted that firms with 
larger board size pay their CEOs higher level of total compensation and moreover, proportion of non-executive 
directors on board does not have a significant impact on CEO cash compensation, while non-executive directors’ 
share ownership has a significant impact suggesting that ownership can provide incentives for non-executive 
directors to be more active in monitoring for CEO compensation packages.  
Fernandes, (2005) examined the determinants of managerial compensation, with a special emphasis on the 
relation between compensation and firm performance of companies listed in the Portuguese Stock Exchange. 
The study showed that compensation is not related to shareholders wealth, nor do shareholders have any 
mechanism to influence it. The results suggest that very few companies have what is really considered an 
independent director that looks after shareholders interests. The results suggested that company performance is 
not significantly related to executive compensation.  
Gao and Shrieves (2002), studied how the components of compensation influence earnings management 
behavior. They hypothesized an observation that discretion over accounting accruals gives managers a 
potentially valuable timing option that will lead to strategies for maximizing their compensation. They found 
strong evidence that compensation contract design influence earnings management, and that the influences of the 
various compensation components appear to be largely predictable on a presumption that managers behave 
opportunistically by exploiting timing options embedded in some components of the compensation contracts. 
2.8.Conceptual Framework 
Optimal incentive compensation plans control the kinds of conflicts of interest in agency relationship. Effective 
compensation plans add value to the firm by improving the alignment of management incentives with 
stockholders interest leading to improved performance. Firm's earnings would be affected by intervening events 
that are not under managerial control. It is a process that encompasses independent, moderating and dependent 
variables as shown in figure 1. 
2.81.Capital adequacy: net premium written-policyholders’ surplus ratio. 
This  standard  is devised  in  an  attempt to  measure  the  strength  of  insurance  companies. Strength  of  a  
company  means  the ability  to  withstand  the  risks  of  insurance.  There  are two  types  of  risks  inherent  in  
the  insurance  business: underwriting  risks,  which  is  the  exposure  of  surplus  from  normal insurance  
underwriting  operations  of  an  insurance  company  and investment  risk,  which  is  encountered  because  
most  insurance  companies  invest  in  the  stock  market. 
2.82.Underwriting Ratios 
The operating ratio is defined as: Combined Ratio - Net Investment Income Ratio. The operating ratio measures 
a company’s overall operational profitability from underwriting and investment activities. This ratio excludes 
other operating income and expenses, capital gains and losses, and income taxes. An operating ratio greater than 
100% suggests that the company is unable to generate profits from its underwriting and investment activities. 
2.83.Solvency Margins 
Solvency margin asses insurer’s ability to meet financial obligations (claims and maturities). The Solvency 
Margin Ratio (SMR) is calculated by taking Available Solvency Margin (ASM) divided by Required Solvency 
Margin (RSM) as a percentage. ASM refers to the difference between the admitted assets and liabilities of an 
insurer. The RSM under general insurance business is arrived at by taking 15% of the Net premium income 
written, while that for long term business is arrived at by taking 5% of the insurer’s admitted liabilities for the 
last preceding financial year.  
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3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Design 
The study adopted a causal research design by examining the relationship between executive compensation and 
financial performance among the insurance companies 
3. 2 Population of the Study  
This is a census study of all the forty six (46) registered companies in Kenya over five year period from 2006 to 
2010.  
3. 3 Data Collection 
The study employed secondary data collected from the financial statements published and filed with Insurance 
Regulatory Authority of Kenya over five year period between 2006 and 2010.  
3. 4 Data Analysis 
A multiple regression model was used to analyze the data using statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS) 
version 12. Analysis was done using Pearson correlation to measure the association (see table 2) and ANOVA to 
test relationship (see table 4) between executive compensation and financial performance of insurance 
companies. The study adopted the following regression model: 
Y = α+ β1X1+β2X2+β3X3+β4X4+µ 
Where: Y = CEO Remuneration, α = Intercept, X1 = Capital Adequacy Ratio, X2 = Solvency Ratio, X3 = 
Incurred Claims Ratio, X4 = Expense Ratio, µ = Prediction error.  
Mean financial performance ratios were calculated to combine all the five year period (see table 1).  To test the 
hypothesis of the study, correlation analysis was used and the results are presented in table 2. From the results, 
the null hypotheses on the effect of the key ratios on executive compensation were accepted at P<0.001 
significance level or any other lower level, leading to the conclusion that the four key ratios were not statistically 
significant. The relationship between capital and CEO remuneration is positive, weak and not significant 
(P>0.001) hence we do not reject the null hypothesis. The relationship between solvency and CEO remuneration 
is negative, weak and not significant (P>0.001) hence we do not reject the null hypothesis. The relationship 
between claims and CEO remuneration was negative, very weak and not significant (P>0.001) therefore we do 
not reject the null hypothesis. The relationship between expense and CEO remuneration is negative, very weak 
and not significant (P>0.001). 
The F test statistic is the F value of 1.153. Using a significance level of 0.001, we have the F0.001; 4, 43 = 5.46. 
Since the test statistic is smaller than the critical value, we do not reject the null hypothesis of equal population 
means and conclude that there was no (statistically) significant difference among the population means. The p-
value for 1.153 is 0.345, so P<0.001 thus the test statistic was not significant at that level or any lower level. 
Linear regression therefore, demonstrated no significant relationship between executive compensation and 
financial performance of insurance companies in Kenya.  
The results indicate the correlation (0.311). The R
2
 for the straight line regression model is 0.097 indicating how 
much variation has been explained by the model. This means that 9.7 % of the total variability in the study has 
been explained by the straight line regression model, which is not much. This linear model is not fit enough to 
explain the existing variability. The Durbin-Watson test statistic tests the null hypothesis that the residuals from 
an ordinary least-squares regression are not auto correlated against the alternative. The Durbin-Watson statistic 
ranges in value from 0 to 4. A value near 2 indicates non-autocorrelation; a value toward 0 indicates positive 
autocorrelation; a value toward 4 indicates negative autocorrelation. The results indicate non-autocorrelation 
(2.064). 
The regression model is thus expressed as;    
CEO Rem = 224,116.177 + 415.245 Capital (P=0.088) + 61.135 Solvency (P=0.805) - 846.153 
Claims (P=0.605) – 1,212.312 Expense (P=0.088) 
The regression model shows that, an increase in Capital Adequacy and Solvency positively affects the 
remuneration, whereas increase in Incurred Claims and Expense has a negative impact on remuneration (as 
shown in table 6). 
 
4.0 CONCLUSION  
The study finds negative non significant relationship between executive compensation and financial performance. 
This is similar to the findings of Aduda (2011) who established negative non significant relationship in the 
Kenyan banking sector. The negative correlation suggests capping compensation to maximize shareholders 
returns. Since p-value is greater than 0.05, we therefore do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
is no significant relationship between executive compensation and financial performance. Since p-value is 
greater than 0.001, we therefore do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is no significant 
relationship between executive compensation and financial performance. Insurance companies should 
incorporate their compensation structure with the use of incentives plans that motivate the CEO to take actions 
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that increase shareholders wealth. The plans tie executive compensation to performance with little monitoring 
reducing agency problem. It attracts and retains managers with confidence to risk their financial future on their 
own abilities leading to maximization of shareholders wealth. Further in order to maintain the social order and 
prepare for future market liberalization, apart from strengthening management abilities, more attention should be 
given to capital structure and capital management as well as adopting risk based management practices.  In 
considering the investment function, emphasis should be put on relevance of asset- liability management as well 
as adopting solvency modernization initiatives including policyholder protection and loss absorbency. 
Further research can be undertaken on the broad concept of complexity and power and their influence on 
executive compensation. The research should test how the concept of complexity influences compensation 
contracts despite strong theoretical ground and compensation consultants’ inclusion of complexity in job 
evaluation work. 
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Table 1: Insurance Companies CA, SM, ER, and CEO remuneration averages 
 
No. 
 
Insurance Co. 
Capital 
Adequacy 
Solvency 
Margin 
Claims 
Ratios 
 
Expense 
Ratio 
 
CEO Rem. 
1 A P A           271.8           339.8             75.2             15.0        502,379.20  
2 AIG (K)          190.2           189.0             31.8             20.6        191,583.20  
3 AMACO          353.6           301.8             55.2             18.0        286,411.80  
4 Apollo             71.8           326.2             27.4               7.2          46,520.00  
5 Blue Shield          445.8           101.6             38.8               8.4        532,794.40  
6 British American          266.2           164.0             36.8             21.6        732,228.00  
7 Cannon             67.6           643.4             71.8             19.2        178,689.60  
8 Capex               2.2             31.6               4.4                 -            12,365.60  
9 CfC Life           296.0           172.6             59.6               9.8        597,280.00  
10 Chartis (K)            58.4           126.8             30.4             11.8        180,593.80  
11 Concord           627.0           259.6             74.6             17.4        232,479.60  
12 Cooperative          373.6           277.0             60.2             10.8        573,462.80  
13 Corporate           261.4           329.4             60.2             16.0        121,861.00  
14 Directline           632.2           479.6             55.6             11.8        237,883.20  
15 East Africa Re            96.4           533.6             59.4             12.8        121,846.80  
16 Fidelity Shield           146.8           334.2             76.0             19.0        158,750.80  
17 First Assurance           219.6           402.2             73.4             21.6        184,494.60  
18 Gateway           230.8           473.6             60.0               8.2        207,695.60  
19 Geminia           107.8           516.8             75.4             20.2          99,381.20  
20 General Accident           105.0           556.6             68.8             18.6        198,959.60  
21 ICEA           255.6           143.0             80.0             20.6        515,089.60  
22 Intra Africa           381.2           195.2             67.8               9.6        140,433.40  
23 Invesco           151.8           108.8             26.4               4.0        104,757.60  
24 Kenindia           185.8           247.6             70.8             17.2        569,375.80  
25 Kenya Orient           185.4           289.0           143.6               8.0        145,277.60  
26 Kenya Re            46.4           686.6             43.4             16.8        794,917.20  
27 KNAC (2001)          160.4           325.6             60.6               9.0        105,565.60  
28 Lion of Kenya            82.0           532.6             84.6             20.6        160,274.80  
29 Madison           534.6           278.8             61.0               9.6        376,614.20  
30 Mayfair             87.4           555.2             73.8             37.2          60,610.80  
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31 Mercantile             79.6           531.2             56.4             14.0        122,115.20  
32 Metropolitan Life           120.4           389.6             20.6             18.8        104,824.00  
33 Occidental           275.8           266.4             68.2             10.0        148,857.60  
34 Old Mutual           159.4           343.0             39.6             13.8        929,917.80  
35 Pacis           179.6           524.2             65.2             14.4          76,544.20  
36 Pan Africa Life           492.2           228.8             29.2             19.2        444,803.40  
37 Phoenix           203.4           338.8             70.6             21.4        173,500.40  
38 Pioneer           474.2           258.4             40.0             20.2          98,235.20  
39 REAL           521.4           132.4             65.4             20.2        207,330.00  
40 Standard           243.2           143.4             16.8               3.6          83,959.20  
41 Tausi           278.8           268.4             70.6             26.6        106,477.00  
42 The Heritage AII          366.2           277.4             63.4             14.8        491,143.20  
43 The Jubilee           530.0           325.6             57.0               9.0        707,033.60  
44 The Kenyan Alliance           118.6           499.0             66.4             13.2        157,359.80  
45 The Monarch             93.6           698.0             47.4             15.6          77,594.80  
46 Trident           202.2           476.2             84.0             14.2          57,844.40  
47 Trinity Life          791.4           481.8             34.2           430.4          20,348.60  
48 UAP Provincial          238.2           514.0             58.0             17.4        772,970.60  
(Source: IRA Annual reports) 
 
Table 2: Correlations values for capital, solvency, claims, expense and remuneration 
   Capital Solvency Claims Expense  Rem# 
Capital Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -0.277 -0.014 0.437(**) 0.166 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.057 0.926 0.002 0.261 
N 48 48 48 48 48 
Solvency Pearson 
Correlation 
-0.277 1 0.279 0.156 -0.114 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.057 . 0.055 0.290 0.441 
N 48 48 48 48 48 
Claims Pearson 
Correlation 
-0.014 0.279 1 -0.119 -0.037 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.926 0.055 0.00 0.420 0.802 
N 48 48 48 48 48 
Expense Pearson 
Correlation 
0.437(**) 0.156 -0.119 1 -0.155 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.290 0.420 0.00 0.294 
N 48 48 48 48 48 
 Rem# Pearson 
Correlation 
0.166 -0.114 -0.037 -0.155 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.261 0.441 0.802 0.294 . 
N 48 48 48 48 48 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 3: Analysis of variance for insurance companies  
Model   Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 SSR 
   SSE 
   SST 
Regression 259452966794.755 4 64863241698.689 1.153 0.345(a) 
Residual 2419320706792.363 43 56263272250.985     
Total 2678773673587.117 47       
(a)  Predictors: Expense, Claim, Solvency and Capital (b) Dependent Variable:  Remuneration 
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Table 4: F distribution Critical values  
p 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 0.001 
F (4, 43) 2.06 2.56 3.05 3.72 5.46 
 
Table 5: Model Summary (b) 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Durbin-Watson 
1 .311(a) .097 .013 2.064 
(a) Predictors: (Constant), Expense, Claims, Solvency, Capital. (b) Dependent Variable:  Rem 
 
Table 6: Unstandardized and standardized Coefficients (a) 
Model   
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 224116.177 128422.194   1.745 0.088 
Capital 415.245 238.245 0.310 1.743 0.088 
Solvency 61.135 245.531 0.042 0.249 0.805 
Claims -846.153 1623.639 -0.081 -0.521 0.605 
Expense -1212.312 693.578 -0.306 -1.748 0.088 
(a) Dependent Variable:  Rem 
 
